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The Latent Function 
of the Production Council 
A. Ben-Porat 
The author présents a functional analysis of the Production 
Council in Israeli industry. He first présents the P.C. *s manifest 
function and discusses its existence and reasoning. He then pro-
vides a latent function interprétation of the phenomenon andsug-
gests that this interprétation adequately explains the phenomenon 
and contributes to its understanding within the enterprise context. 
By définition, an organization has a charter which spécifies its struc-
ture, modus operandi, and its goals or purposes. In theory, if the charter is 
rational and the organization has control over the outcome of certain 
variables, thèse goals will be realized. In practice, however, one often finds 
that an organization will deviate from its charter and fulfill some unintend-
ed function. It is désirable, therefore, to explain such déviation in order to 
specify the function of the organization. 
Merton's (1968) distinction between manifest and latent functions 
leads to the suggestion than an organization's déviation from its charter 
originates and is maintained because the conséquences of such déviations 
are functional in terms of criteria other than those encompassed by the 
manifest function.1 Thus, Merton offers a functional explanation of an 
organization*s déviation from its manifest function. 
In the présent paper we présent a functional analysis of the Production 
Council (P.C.) in Israeli industry.2 We first présent the P.C.'s manifest 
function and discuss its existence and reasoning. Subsequently, we provide 
• BEN-PORAT, A., Professor, Department of Behavioral Sciences, Ben-Gurion 
University of the Negev, Israël. 
1 In a later paper, Merton (1976) states that latent social problems are "...Those un-
wanted social conditions that are at odds with some of the (often undeclared) values and in-
terests of group and strata in society but are not generally recognized as being so" (p. 173). 
2 The Research Study's Report is available in: BEN-PORAT, A., The Production 
Council in Israël, Economie and Research Institute, Histadruth, Tel Aviv, 1971 (in Hebrew), 
and also in Ben-Porat (1973). 
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a latent function interprétation of the phenomenon and suggest that this in-
terprétation adequately explains the phenomenon and contributes to its 
understanding within the enterprise context. Examples of this approach are 
available in the literature (Seleznick, 1949; Gouldner, 1958). 
Merton's functional approach concerning the testing and application 
of the social phenomenon in the so-called micro-level structure3 enables the 
student to interpret a social phenomenon using the functional-structural 
method while ignoring the problematic philosophy of the gênerai theory 
(Wallace, 1969). The ongoing debate (Lockwood, 1956; Hemipel, 1959; 
Scott, 1963; Turner, 1974; Blake, 1961; Gouldner, 1959; Davis, 1959; 
Homance and Schneider, 1955) about the functional theory does not con-
cern us hère. 
By définition, a functional analysis is based on a detailed report of the 
studied phenomenon — the Protocol (Merton, 1968). The student is re-
quired to describe the phenomenon with regard to its structure, patterns of 
behavior and the relationships between the studied phenomenon and its 
related social structure. Practically, it is impossible to encompass in this 
paper both a detailed description and an analysis of the P.C. and its social 
surrounding. Therefore, we présent a brief description of the P.C. that em-
phasizes only those variables which are essential to the understanding of the 
particular 'item' and its relevant interprétation. Based on this description, 
we suggest the key variables for the functional analysis and treat the 
phenomenon according to a paradigmatic model which states the causal 
relationships between patterns of behavior and desired or, alternatively, 
unintended conséquences, regarding both the manifest and the latent func-
tions. 
THE PRODUCTION COUNCIL 
The présent description of the P.C. in Israeli industry and the évidence 
discussed later are based on a field study aimed at establishing the causal 
relationship between certain behavior conséquences and regarding the "in-
put" of the P.C. to the enterprise System.4 The formai présentation of the 
phenomenon is derived from the Agreement between the Histadruth (the 
3 This paper applies a micro-type analysis to the enterprise level. Although the in-
dustrial System at the national level is, by définition, a macro-phenomenon (DUNLOP, 1958), 
we are not dealing with this level, even though our explanations are based on the links between 
the macro and micro levels (see MERTON, 1976; BLAU, 1964.). 
4 BEN-PORAT, A., The Production Council in Israël, Economie and Social Research 
Institute, Histadruth, Tel Aviv, 1971 (in Hebrew). 
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Fédération of Labour in Israël) and the Manufacturer Association.5 This 
Agreement is considered as the "charter*' of the P.C., since it defines its 
aims, modus operandi and norms of behavior. 
The P.C. in the enterprise is a body composed of equal numbers of 
workers and management représentatives. Two représentatives are ap-
pointed, one by the Worker's Committee — an elected body which 
represents the workers in the enterprise in matters of worker-management 
relationships — and the other by the management. The remaining members 
are elected by the group which they represent. 
The manifest function of the P.C. is stated in the preamble of the 
Agreement: "To ensure co-operation between workers and management of 
enterprises for the purpose of finding ways and means for the development 
of industrial enterprises... To increase efficiency and raise productivity... 
To establish adéquate working methods and incentive wages..." (1967, pp. 
1-2). The explicit purpose of the P.C. Agreement was to separate the P.C.'s 
jurisdiction from the conventional, collective bargaining System between 
the management and the worker's committee6 in the enterprise (Ben-Porat, 
1973). 
Preambles tend to state the ideology of the organization, while the 
organizational structure attempts to translate ideological concepts into 
practical terms of behavior, such as rôle définitions, procédures, etc. The 
formai structure of the P.C. was established in the sensé of its manifest 
function by the preamble, which states the procédural methods by which the 
P.C. opérâtes, its jurisdiction, and the activities of the P.C. Thèse activities 
are of two types: those investing the P.C. with executive powers and those 
giving it the privilège to receive information concerning the enterprise's 
économie position. In this paper we intend to deal with the first type of ac-
tivity which is directly related to the P.C.'s manifest function. 
As already stated above, the P.C. is composed of elected members of 
the parties in the enterprise. The Council is elected for a term of one year. 
One third of the members of each "new" P.C., however, are carry-overs 
from the previous year. This arrangement is to ensure continuity. Although 
substitution of elected participants is required by the Agreement, it is not in-
5 The P.C. Agreement, an appendix to the Collective Agreement between the 
Histadruth and the Manufacturers Association, appears under the heading "General 
Agreement-Agreed Rules Concerning Production Councils", Tel Aviv, April 1967. 
6 The worker's committee is the body elected by the workers in the organization to 
represent the latter vis-a-vis the management. 
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tended to be a full scale substitution which usually means a new 'socializa-
tion' of each P.C.'s members into their rôles. On the other hand, élection 
and substitution tend to ensure that the P.C. is a représentative body. 
Another élément in the structure which is important in the présent con-
text is the procédures by which the P.C. carries out its activities. Décision 
making is by vote on the spécifie subject, with a simple majority being suffi-
cient to approve a resolution. Furthermore, resolutions of the P.C. are bin-
ding on the management and the worker's committee leaving thèse groups 
with very little direct influence on the P.C. and formally guaranteeing the 
autonomy of the P.C. within its jurisdiction. 
In view of the above brief description it is advisable to emphasize three 
main points which are connected to the relationship between conséquences 
and the particular structure of the P.C. We regard conséquences as those 
which are désirable and tend to be maintained, and according to Stin-
chcombe " Which in turn function as cause of behavior or structure to be 
explained,, (1968, p. 87): 
1) The function of the P.C. is anchored within the production subsystem 
in the enterprise.7 Since the P.C. contributes some defined 'input' to 
this subsystem, the desired conséquences should be pursued hère. Con-
séquent^, the activities invested in the P.C. are patterned so as to 
achieve the desired conséquences. Thus, if one is concerned with the 
function of the P.C. in the enterprise, he should be concerned with the 
production subsystem. However, in order to establish the functional 
relationship between the P.C. and this subsystem, the point of depar-
ture is the P.C.'s structure and its patterned behavior, since the struc-
ture is designed to accomplish spécifie ends. 
2) By définition, the P.C. is a représentative body. Représentation, at 
least from the workers' point of view, is essential since it régulâtes the 
relationship between the "mass" of the workers and the P.C. while giv-
ing them the feeling of involvement. Therefore, the regular process of 
participatory élections is not a mère technicality, but is considered as an 
important means to function accomplishment. 
3) The P.C. consists of participants who represent the interests of dif-
férent référence groups.8 This spécifies interalia the potential conflict 
7 A functional description and analysis of the industrial System are suggested by Dunlop 
(1958). In this study we use some of his concepts to treat the enterprise as a System. We identify 
subsystems by their focal rôles and indicate their interrelationships. 
8 See MERTON (1976, pp. 156-179), regarding sociological éléments of commissions. 
In many of its features the P.C. is a commission type. 
THE LATENT FUNCTION OF THE PRODUCTION COUNCIL 451 
inhérent with the P.C. Yet, much of the potential conflict is an "exter-
nal" one derived from the relationship between the P.C. and the 
worker's committee or the management. In order to attenuate the 
potential conflict, the P.C. is autonomous within its jurisdiction. Its 
autonomy is guaranteed by its formai définition and the aforemention-
ed relationship between the P.C. and other bodies within the enterprise. 
Thus, the P.C. deals with a particular set of tasks over which it alone 
has authority. Moreover, the décisions made by the P.C. bind the par-
ties in the enterprise, and ensure its authority over the management and 
the worker's committee. 
We hâve discussed the above three points as if they are independent of 
each other. They are, however, interrelated by the concept of participation 
which, although it is a limited form (Bar-Yosef and Bar-Haim, 1975) con-
cerning the production subsystem only, constitutes the basic motive for the 
P.C. in the Israeli case. For example, although the end seems to be technical 
(productivity) the participative motive guides the sélection of the relevant 
structure.9 When dealing with the manifest function proposition, we im-
plicitly assume that the frame of référence is that of participation whithin 
the production subsystem. 
THE RESEARCH STUDY 
The study of the P.C. in the enterprise setting began with a pilot study 
which provided the necessary information about the P.C.'s structure, 
définition of rôles, activities, etc. When this stage was completed a sample 
of 70 P.C.'s out of a population of 400 in Israeli industry was studied. The 
sample was chosen to ensure the representativeness of three important 
variables: size of enterprise, économie branch and type of ownership. 201 
people were interviewed, 104 from the worker's group (including the chair-
man of the worker's committee) and 97 from management (including per-
sonnel management). Within each enterprise of the sample both worker and 
management participants were interviewed. On the average, 3 people were 
interviewed for each P.C. The study gathered information on: A) the struc-
ture of the P.C.; b) the behavior of the P.C., and c) the cognitive responses 
of the participants regarding a and b. 
9 Productivity may be achieved by means other than the P.C. By establishing the P.C. it 
was explicitly assumed that the particular participative structure is, under certain conditions, 
the most effective one for achieving desired ends. 
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In this paper we mainly use the information refering to the structure of 
the P.C. The information is independent of the attitudes or motives of the 
participants. However, in the last section of the paper, we uphold our sug-
gested interprétation of the P.C., by évidence taken from the gênerai study 
(Ben-Porat, 1971, 1973). 
As stated above, our analysis is based on three key variables which we 
considered to be the most important ones regarding the P.C.'s structure and 
function. Thèse three variables are: the pattern of représentation, the pat-
tern of autonomy and the pattern of performance. However, before presen-
ting the data and its interprétation we présent a paradigm of the functional 
model, which spécifies the variables and their causal explanation. 
With regard to the causal explanation (Stinchcombe, 1968; Merton, 
1957) the model first distinguishes between conséquences and causes, and 
then indicates two alternative anchors for conséquences, the production 
subsystem and the enterprise.10 The model also indicates two types of causal 
behavior, normative and actual. For both types it is assumed that behavior 
is a cause for certain conséquences (Stinchcombe, 1968). 
The model also provides the framework for the study's proposition 
regarding the relationship between either normative or actual patterns of 
behavior and conséquences: When normative and actual patterns of 
behavior are the same, the P.C. maintains its manifest functions, and con-
séquences which tend to be maintained are caused by the normative pat-
terns.11 However, when normative and actual patterns of behavior are dif-
férent we propose that either the actual patterns exhibit an alternative struc-
ture (Merton, 1968), or the actual patterns are related to différent consé-
quences which are not intended by the participants but which are functional 
in the enterprise's System or some of its units (excluding the production 
one). The latter proposition points to the necessity of testing the causal rela-
tionship between conséquences and patterns of behavior, with the possibili-
ty that other units in the enterprise are involved. It is proposed therefore, 
that when actual but /20/2-normative patterns of behavior are found to be 
related to the production System, it is an alternative structure proposition 
which explains the phenomenon. In other words, conséquences are main-
tained through P.C. activities other than the normative pre-planned ones. 
10 We consider the enterprise as a whole unit. However, we shall specify the particular 
subsystem to which the P.C. is found to contribute. 
11 Without disturbing the logic of functional explanation, we may argue that in this 
situation the P.C. causes particular and desired conséquences within the production sub-
system. 
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When actual but rtort-normative patterns of behavior are not related to the 
production subsystem, we propose the latent function as an alternative in-
terprétation; relevant conséquences should be sought within the enterprise 
as a whole or within subsystems other than the production subsystem. 
We thus are dealing with three propositions: the manifest function pro-
position, the alternative structure activity proposition and the lalent func-
tion proposition. The order of the propositions is not accidentai, but 
follows the logic of the functional explanation which suggests a causal ex-
planation for the présent phenomenon. 
In functional analysis one is faced with the problem of who's intention 
to take into account in the manifest functions. Our point of departure is the 
objective and formally defined conséquences of the P.C. Thus, we deal with 
the charter embodied in the P.C. agreement, which clearly states the func-
tions of the P.C. in the organizational production subsystem, and its rela-
tion to other subsystems in the organization. Therefore we distinguish bet-
ween normative patterns of behavior, established to achieve the P.C.'s 
desired conséquences, and actual patterns of behavior. The distinction bet-
ween manifest and latent function is based upon the study of the différences 
between normative and actual behavior and the conséquences of both types 
of behavior. Individual intentions and motives are included at the end of 
this paper, but they are not to be confused with the objective description of 
the P.C. or with the évaluation of the function fulfilled by the P.C. 
Another basic problem of functional analysis is the accusation of 
tautological or teleological reasoning. Foliowing Stinchcombe (1968) we use 
the "reverse causal chain'\ The interprétation of the latent function of the 
P.C. is based on the assertion that the System's needs exist prior to the 
establishment of the P.C. in the enterprise. Thus we do not propose that the 
P.C. is maintained to fulfill this particular system's needs. However, we 
suggest that in the présent context of the organization, thèse needs are met 
by the P.C. This argument states that the cause is différent from the consé-
quence (Turner, 1974). 
THE MANIFEST FUNCTION PROPOSITION 
In this part of the paper we deal with three key variables: the pattern of 
représentation, the pattern of autonomy and the pattern of performance. 
Each pattern is studied according to the proposition derived from the model 
(Figure 1); the actual behavior of the P.C. is compared with the expected 
normative behavior, assuming that the manifest function is causally related 
to normative patterns of behavior. 
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The patterns's analysis is a qualitative one. Although it is possible to 
provide the same functional analysis in quantitative terms, a descriptive 
mode of représentation serves our aim better than a quantitative one since 
the former éliminâtes the need to treat many, sometimes private results, 
while its procédures are based on the model concepts and "are readily open 
to critical scrutiny" (Merton, 1976, p. 212). We begin by presenting the nor-
mative patterns for each variable as stated by the P.C. Agreement, and test 
the actual patterns accordingly. The analysis is based upon a gross com-
parison between normative and actual patterns of behavior, and intends to 
assess the 'déviation' of actual from normative behavior. It is already noted 
that the différences between normative and actual patterns indicate that the 
manifest function is not maintained. 
FIGURE 1 
The functional model for the P.C. 
CONSEQUENCES TO THE ENTERPRISE 
OR SOME OF ITS UNITS 
(c)A 
(bK, 
s ' 
CONSEQUENCES TO THE 
PRODUCTION SUBSYSTEM 
,+' (a) A 
ACTUAL PATTERNS OF 
BEHAVIOUR 
NORMATIVE PATTERNS OF 
BEHAVIOUR 
s 
THE PRODUCTION COUNCIL 
Legend: 
a) Causal design relationships between patterns of behaviour and conséquences in the produc-
tion subsystem. 
b) Causal non-design relationships between patterns of behaviour and conséquences in the 
production subsystem. 
c) Causal non-design nonintended relationships between patterns of behaviour and consé-
quences in the System as a whole, excluding the production subsystem. 
THE LATENT FUNCTION OF THE PRODUCTION COUNCIL 455 
Variable A: The pattern of représentation 
THE NORMATIVE PATTERN 
The standard of représentation in the P.C. is formulated in terms of 
élection12 of the représentative for one year time and substitution of two-
thirds of the représentatives each year. Each party in the enterprise elect its 
own représentatives in the P.C. in "... direct and personal élection" (Agree-
ment, 1967, p. 10). Thus one expects to find that first, the P.C. is an elected 
body and second that people serve in the P.C. for a limited period — not 
more than two years (two terms).13 
THE ACTUAL PATTERN 
When we examine the actual behavior in the P.C. with respect to the 
pattern of représentation, we find that most of the workers représentatives 
(75 °7o) were nominated by the workers committee in the enterprise. This 
resuit is obtained by recoding each member in the P.C. by the way he was 
'elected' to the council (n = 97). Furthermore, when we measure each 
members length of service on the P.C., we found that the majority of both 
groups (worker and management) serve more than the standard. 
TABLE 1 
Distribution of P.C. Members by Years in Office for Both Parties 
Years in the P.C.: 1 2 3 4 5 + a 
Représentatives of: 17 22 24 20 14 
workers N 
(n = 97) % 
17 
(18) 
20 
(20) 
24 
(25) 
20 
(20) 
16 
(17) 
management N 
(n=104) % 
9 
(.09) 
17 
(16) 
15 
(14) 
40 
(39) 
23 
(22) 
a
 The category 5 + includes thèse people that serve 5 and more years. 
12 The présent variable was dealt with mainly for the workers, since by the nature of 
their status in the enterprise the process of élection is relevant to them more than to manage-
ment. We realized however, that it is also important for management concerning, for instance, 
'management prérogative' (CHANDLER, 1964). 
13 Elections and substitutions are intended to maintain the représentation of the P.C. 
(see above). Both terms are clearly specified in the Agreement as éléments which are important 
in obtaining the P.C.'s manifest function (BEN-PORAT, 1973). 
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Table 1 illustrâtes the actual situation in the P.C. at the time of the 
research study. It appears that if one tests the standard pattern in com-
parison to the actual pattern of years in office, the déviation is obvious. On-
ly 39% of the workers' représentatives, and 25% of the management 
représentatives serve according to the above mentioned standard. The ac-
tual pattern of représentation is therefore, that of nomination and non-
substitution. 
The discrepancy between normative and actual patterns of représenta-
tion provides the first indication that some non-normative behavior affects 
the function of the P.C. The rules which are intended to maintain participa-
tion through représentation are violated by the participants who assume the 
rôle for such a long time that the rôle becomes identified with the particular 
office holder (see also, Etzioni, 1961). This point is considered hère from 
the point of view of the P.C., rather than the individuals. It is a structural 
and not an individual dilemma (Merton, 1976, p. 9). 
Variable B: The pattern of autonomy 
THE NORMATIVE PATTERN 
The normative pattern of the P.C. status in the enterprise is that of 
authority within its jurisdiction "...The Council shall not interfer with the 
powers of the management of the enterprise or of the workers committee 
and vice versa" (Agreement, 1967, p. 10). This is intended to separate the 
P.C. from the other formai groups in the enterprise, since the autonomy of 
the P.C. is seen as an imperative élément in its function fulfillment. 
Autonomy is assessed from this point of view: the interférence of the 
management, of the workers or both in the jurisdiction of the P.C. 
THE ACTUAL PATTERN 
In practice, the autonomy of the P.C. is severely limited. The manage-
ment and the workers committee interfère with the P.C.'s décision making 
process, rejecting its décisions and, very often, forcing their particular in-
terests upon the P.C. (see présentation in table 2). 
The patterns in table 2 indicate whether the management or the 
workers committee, or both, force their private or joint interests upon the 
P.C. Thèse patterns are based on information gathered about the relations 
between the P.C. and thèse bodies, with regard to interférences in the 
P.C.'s décision making process. The actual pattern of behavior is therefore 
a 'monitoring' pattern, where the activity of the P.C. is controlled by thèse 
THE LATENT FUNCTION OF THE PRODUCTION COUNCIL 457 
TABLE 2 
Patterns of Intervention by Management, Workers' Committee and Both (n = 70). 
Patterns of intervention" 
P.C. in Management Workers Both 
numbers committee 
31 + 
15 + 
9 + 
6 — 
3 + 
3 — 
2 — 
aThe sign + indicates that one or more of the following kinds of interférence occur: before the 
process starts; in the middle of the process and when décision has been already reached. 
bodies. Evidently, the référence group of the P.C.'s participants (either the 
workers or the management) is an important factor which, beside its in-
fluence upon the P.C.'s autonomy, has an impact upon its performance. 
The déviation of actual from normative behavior is clearly presented in 
table 2. The normative pattern should hâve been "-,-,-,"; we found this 
state for only two out of seventy P.C.s. The autonomy of the P.C. thus ap-
pears to be restricted. 
Variable C: The pattern of performance 
THE NORMATIVE PATTERN 
The normative pattern of performance regards the activities which in-
vest the P.C. with executive power ('the jurisdiction') "...The Council shall 
dévote attention to: Production... Saving manpower... Rational ar-
rangements of the machinery... Saving raw material... Condition of equip-
ment... Training... Productivity" (Agreement, 1967, pp. 5-9). Thèse ac-
tivities détail the main function of the P.C. in the production subsystem of 
the enterprise. Thus, their implementation is a measure of whether or not 
the P.C. maintains its manifest function. Accordingly, the Agreement 
spécifies the P.C. executive power, spelling out the tasks of the Council. We 
hâve to dwell in this point before progressing to the actual pattern since the 
normative pattern in this case has to be set up in measurable terms in order 
to make a valid comparison between the normative and the actual pattern. 
According to the P.C.'s Agreement, the Council is expected to perform 
a set of tasks regarding its manifest function. Ail together, the Agreement 
cites 17 différent issues, divided into two catégories: those issues which the 
P.C. has an executive and sole power, and those receiving information but 
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not making décisions. Eight out of the 17 issues are classified by the Agree-
ment as Power executive ones and we use thèse issues to define the nor-
mative pattern: I. "norm and premium"; II. "quality of product"; III. 
"efficiency suggestions''; IV. "individual level of output"; V. "training"; 
VI. "administration"; VII "work disputes" and VIII. "saving".14 
THE ACTUAL PATTERN 
In order to détermine the actual activity of the P.C. one would hâve to 
détermine the frequency with which the P.C. treats each issue, ranking them 
from most to least fréquent. The Agreement, however, does not specify 
order or frequency for any of the issues. Nevertheless, we can dérive a com-
parative standard for the context of the P.C.: the P.C. should treat each of 
the above eight issues at least once per year. This is slightly biased standard 
since a one year term might be unsatisfactory; however, as we shall see later, 
the suggested standard appears to be valid and reliable. 
For each P.C. we checked the above eight issues. Information was ob-
tained by a particular question inserted in the questionnaire (see above) 
which asked whether, during the year of the présent research, the P.C. 
either discussed and/or made a décision regarding each issue. The results 
are presented in table 3. 
TABLE 3 
Issues 'Treated' and 'Decided' by the P.C. During one Year Time. 
Issues" I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
% of P.C. 
'Treated' 95 87 77 50 18 26 06 26 
(n = 70) 
°/o of P.C.b 
'Decided' 72 32 18 50 10 9 — 9 
(n = 70) 
a
 See text for the issues names. 
b
 Percentage was calculated on the basis of absolute numbers of the first row. 
14 Although the items appear in abridged form, each item is related to the function of the 
P.C. Therefore, "work dispute" means disagreements concerning time and motion study, 
"administration" is concerned with production arrangements, and so on. 
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The results shown in table 3 lead us to suggest that the frequency with 
which the P.C. tends to treat différent issues varies greatly and that many of 
the P.C.'s did not treat several of the issues even once during the term of 
one year. It appears that the short time span for measurement biased the 
présent results in favour of issues that were expected to be salient (for in-
stance "norms and premiums,'). A check of the issue treatment in the oldest 
P.C.'s (at least 10 years old (n = 23)) over the last 10 years proved that the 
présent actual pattern is valid, i.e., it represents the pattern of activity of the 
P.C. The actual pattern of behavior déviâtes from the normative pattern. It 
appears that the P.C. invests much of its resources in one issue: "norms and 
premiums,\ It should be noted hère that this issue is concerned with work 
quotas (norms) and incentive payments (premium). This resuit indicates the 
actual pattern of the P.C.'s behavior. However, the meaning of this issue 
will be clarified when we deal with the latent function interprétation. 
The results of the normative-actual behavior pattern comparison in-
dicate that actual patterns of behavior are favored and normative patterns 
of behavior tend to be ignored. The functional analysis reveals particular 
patterns of behavior which are différent from the normative ones. In light 
of the causal explanation suggested at the outset of the présent study (see 
figure 1), the présent results should be considered as évidence that the 
manifest function of the P.C. does not explain its function in the enterprise. 
Since we proposed that normative patterns of behavior are causally related 
to its manifest function it follows that the manifest function is accomplish-
ed only when the actual behavior follows the normative patterns. Never-
theless, the logic of the functional explanation suggests an alternative ex-
planation in favor of the manifest function. 
The Alternative Structure Proposition 
The comparison between normative and actual pattern suggests that 
the manifest function is an inadéquate explanation. However, since we are 
using the functional strategy, we may argue that although actual patterns 
are différent from the normative ones, the P.C. is still explained by its 
manifest function. We propose that desired conséquences are accomplished 
by alternative structures or patterns of behavior which in practice fulfill the 
original function (Merton, 1957; Cole, 1973). This argument should be con-
sidered before any conclusion which rejects the manifest function explana-
tion of the P.C. is accepted. 
In order to test the proposition that the desired conséquences are ac-
complished by différent structures, namely by the actual patterns revealed 
in the présent study, we should look at the desired conséquences. 
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Having determined the actual patterns of behavior, the question 
becomes whether conséquences within the production subsystem are main-
tained. This means that some criterion of conséquence évaluation is needed. 
Unfortunately, objective-quantitative criteria such as the level of produc-
tivity were not available; thus, conséquences had to be evaluated by 
qualitative criteria. 
Each P.C. employed a production engineer as a consultant on profes-
sional matters such as "time and motion study". Having served with the 
P.C. for a number of years, the engineer's judgment was considered valid. 
Using a standard form, we asked a group of seventy production engineer s to 
evaluate the contribution of the P.C. to three subsystems in the enterprise: 
the production System, the labour relations System and the welfare System.15 
The scores are on a 5-point scale, from "not at ail" to "very much". By this 
procédure we obtain an évaluation score for each subsystem, ranging from 
a minimum score of 1 ("not at ail") to maximum score of 5 ("very much"). 
Summing up the engineers rating for each subsystem we obtain the follow-
ing results: the P.C.'s contribution to the labour relations subsystem is con-
sidered the greatest (médian score = 3.9) foliowed by the contribution to 
the welfare subsystem (médian score = 3.4); the lowest score is found con-
cerning the P.C.'s contribution to the production System (médian score = 
1.8). This finding points to the relatively small contribution of the P.C. to 
the subsystem in which it is supposed to function. This, however, is only 
partially indicative of the validity of the alternative structure proposition, 
since the results might be influenced by the comparative nature of the ques-
tion. 
A direct indicator of the P.C.'s contribution to the production sub-
system was also used. This indicator consists of three questions regarding 
the activities of the P.C.: a) determining proper norms of work; b) deter-
mining the extent of thèse norms in the enterprise and c) revision of old 
norms. The results obtained seem more favourable regarding the P.C.'s 
contribution to the production System, but the contribution is still less than 
that expected according to the présent proposition. The percentages of the 
engineers which indicated a positive contribution are:16 43%; 53% and 
40%, to questions a, b and c, respectively. This and the former results per-
mit rejection of the alternative structure proposition. The actual patterns of 
behavior do not seem to fulfill the manifest function. 
15 Subsystems were pre-defined by their particular rôles in the enterprise (see DUNLOP, 
1958). The présentation of thèse subsystems to the engineers was done by particular questions. 
16 It is worth noting that each engineer represents one P.C. Thus, the results can be con-
sidered as refering to the P.C.'s and not to the engineer's group. 
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We hâve suggested the causal explanation between patterns of behavior 
and conséquences as a test for the manifest function, stating that either the 
normative patterns or an alternative structure, reflected by the actual pat-
terns, explain the manifest function. Evidently, neither the normative pat-
terns nor the actual ones explain the manifest function. Moreover, when we 
consider the conséquences which are assumed to be caused by the P.C., it 
appears that conséquences should be pursued within subsystems other than 
the production one. 
The Latent Function Proposition 
The interprétation of the study's findings until now followed the causal 
relationships between structure and functions. We proposed that the 
manifest function of the P.C. is connected to the production subsystem in 
the enterprise and that normative patterns of behavior were established by 
the P.C.'s Agreement in order to connect structure and desired ends. 
Although we reject the manifest function as an adéquate explanation of the 
P.C., we suggest that we can provide an interprétation of the présent 
phenomenon which explains its continued existence.17 For this purpose we 
suggest the latent function proposition (Merton, 1968). 
The latent function proposition states that the P.C. provides the parties 
in an enterprise with a mechanism through which collective bargaining on 
day to day issues is maintained in the enterprise level (see also Dunn, 1972). 
In order to test the latent function proposition and to suggest it as the 
proper interprétation of the P.C., we continue to follow the logic of func-
tional analysis. No new or différent évidence is presented, but we suggest an 
extension of the frame of référence by which we established the functional-
causal explanation. 
The frame of référence which is utilized for the présent proposition is 
the collective bargaining process, expanded to include the participative 
model of décision making (Blumberg, 1968), thus extending the range for 
functional interprétation. 
The collective bargaining frame of référence changes the scope of the 
phenomenon by two measures. First, it links the phenomenon of the P.C. to 
the industrial System, regarding the individual enterprise as unit of this 
System, and second, it brings into considération norms of negotiation bet-
n The functional school, whether 'orthodox' or 'reformist', agrées that a social 
phenomenon which repeats itself has a certain function in the system or some of its units 
(STINCHCOMBE, 1968). 
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ween interest groups. In System terms, the range is extended to the macro 
level of the industrial System (in Israël). Although we hâve no intention of 
dealing with this level, it is being considered hère as the "external" part of 
the présent explanation, which is necessary in order to establish the latent 
function proposition. 
A full scale description of the collective bargaining System in Israël is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, since our interprétation of the 
P.C. is dépendent upon this System, we provide a brief description.18 
The main structural characteristic of the collective bargaining System in 
Israël is its high centralization. The process is controlled by the senior par-
ties in the System: the Histadruth and the Manufacturers Association, 
sometimes with the involvement of the government (thèse parties détermine 
content and application of the collective Agreement). Usually, the process 
begins at the top of the industrial System and ends there, or at one level 
below, where the respective national union takes some part in the process. 
Most importantly, the parties at the enterprise level (i.e., the management 
and the worker's committee) hâve no formai part in this process and, except 
in a particular situation or on very spécifie issues, are bound by the collec-
tive agreement. They are supposed to implement the collective agreement 
but not to participate in its formulation. Thus, the "external" System 
(regarding the enterprise) binds the parties within the enterprise, leaving 
them with very limited influence for the satisfaction of their spécifie needs. 
Within this structure, we can explain the P.C. by its latent function in the 
enterprise: meeting the needs of the parties to be involved in the bargaining 
process. The P.C. is a 'bargaining mechanism' for thèse parties at the enter-
prise level. 
The présent study shows that the Patterns of Représentation, 
Autonomy and Performance, where the actual situation is différent from 
the normative patterns, are likely to hâve a functional explanation in causal 
terms of conséquences. Thèse patterns are caused by the latent function of 
the P.C., thus explaining its continued existence. 
The latent function of the P.C., which is revealed by the présent 
analysis is, in functional terms, an objective function, i.e., a function 
related to the System and not to the individual participants in this System. 
Yet, certain motives of the participants in the enterprise explain v/hy the ac-
tual patterns of behavior are continuously maintained. Within the context 
of our interprétation, we distinguish three such motives: 
18 This description is intended to provide the reader with an outline of this System. For a 
functional analysis of the Israeli industrial System see, TAB and GOLDFARBE (1972). 
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a) Economie motive — the P.C. provides the workers' party with a 
mechanism to achieve économie incréments beyond the limits which the 
Collective Agreement set. The fact that the P.C. invests most of its 
resources in the issue of "norm and premium" is due to its effect on in-
dividual income. 
b) The monitoring motive — the P.C. provides the workers' party with a 
method of participating in the control of the enterprise processes. It 
also provides the management party with an instrument for partial con-
trol of the effort-reward relationship. 
c) The tension réduction motive — the P.C. contributes to the réduction 
of tension in the enterprise, since it provides the parties with a 
legitimate process for rewards allocation in which the parties hâve 
much influence. 
We hâve suggested that the P.C.'s existence is explained by its latent 
function in the enterprise System. As long as the P.C. maintains this func-
tion, and continues to contributes to motive accomplishment, the parties 
will continue to maintain the P.C., regardless of its manifest function. We 
are, however, dealing with two levels of function accomplishment: the 
System level and the individual level. Although it is important to distinguish 
between the objective function of the phenomenon and the subjective 
motives of the participants, it is also important to specify the link between 
the two (Merton, 1957). Therefore, we suggest that, considering the latent 
function for the enterprise System an the individuals, the P.C. maintains the 
adjustment of the parties to the enterprise by satisfying certthe enterprise 
system and the individuals, the P.C. maintains the adjustment of the parties 
to the enterprise by satisfying certain important needs and provides a 
legitimate process for satisfying thèse needs. The participants, though they 
use the same "rules of the game" satisfy différent aims. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
When we began the présent study, we proposed the manifest function 
of the P.C. and treated it within the participative frame of référence. 
Foliowing a causal-functional explanation, we explained the P.C. by the 
conséquences of its existence within the production subsystem. When 
analyzing the actual and normative patterns of behavior, we found that the 
former did not correspond to the latter. Moreover, the finding that the con-
séquences did not fit into the production subsystem shows that the alter-
native structure proposition is not applicable. Therefore, we argued that "A 
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functional explanation in which the conséquences serve as a cause is not19 
suggested" (Stinchcombe, 1968, p. 80). Instead, we suggested the latent 
function proposition as an adéquate interprétation of the P.C.'s function in 
the enterprise. To support this proposai, we used the same data but a dif-
férent interprétative framework which extended the scope of functional ex-
planation. 
While interpreting the P.C.'s function as a bargaining mechanism, we 
suggested a causal explanation, regarding the System and the relevant par-
ties. The concept of adjustment provides the functional link for both levels: 
the parties (and their respective individuals) and the enterprise System. It is 
worth noting that although the parties which are involved directly within the 
P.C. consist of particular représentatives only, the latent function of the 
P.C. has an effect upon the non-participants as well, considering their 
économie motive. The individual level, however, is not discussed in the pré-
sent paper, since our interest is primarily with the System level; thus, the 
proposition of the latent function was formulated. The présent interpréta-
tion might be expanded to explain the individual—P.C. relationships. 
The présent study points to the advantages of an unorthodox func-
tional analysis. An interprétation of a social phenomenon which accounts 
for the latent function adds information which contributes to the 
understanding of the phenomenon. Based on the latent function interpréta-
tion we suggest that although the P.C. does not contribute much to the pro-
duction subsystem, its contribution to the enterprise is valuable. 
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La fonction latente du conseil de production 
L'expérience d'Israël 
Par définition, une organisation possède des statuts qui déterminent sa struc-
ture, son fonctionnement, ses buts ou objectifs. En théorie, si les statuts sont ration-
nels et si l'organisation contrôle l'issue de certaines variables, elle peut atteindre sa 
fin. En pratique, cependant, on découvre souvent qu'une organisation s'éloignera de 
ses buts pour remplir une fonction qu'elle ne recherche pas. Il est souhaitable, en 
conséquence, de chercher à expliquer une pareille déviation afin de préciser la fonc-
tion de l'organisation. 
Dans le présent article, nous présentons une analyse fonctionnelle du conseil de 
production dans l'industrie en Israël. Le conseil de production est un organisme for-
mé d'un nombre égal de représentants des travailleurs et des employeurs. Deux re-
présentants sont nommés, l'un par le conseil des ouvriers (un organisme électif qui 
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représente les travailleurs dans l'entreprise en matière de relations professionnelles) 
et l'autre, par la direction. Les autres membres sont élus par le groupe qu'ils repré-
sentent. 
Les fonctions réglementaires du conseil de production sont les suivantes: assurer 
la coopération entre les salariés et la direction de l'entreprise en vue de trouver les 
voies et moyens nécessaires au développement des entreprises industrielles; accroître 
l'efficacité et hausser la productivité; établir des méthodes de travail adéquates et les 
rémunérations au rendement. La fin explicite de l'accord relatif au conseil de pro-
duction est de séparer nettement la compétence du conseil de production du régime 
de négociations collectives entre la direction et le conseil des ouvriers au sein de l'en-
treprise. Les procédés par lequels le conseil de production exerce son activité sont 
établis dans cet accord. Les décisions du conseil de production lient la direction et le 
conseil des ouvriers, ce qui laisse les groupes sans beaucoup d'influence directe for-
melle sur le conseil de production. 
En vue d'examiner le conseil de production dans l'industrie en Israël, nous 
avons utilisé la théorie fonctionnelle de Merton (1957) et de Stinchcombe (1968). 
Nous avons considéré ensuite trois propositions: a) la proposition de la fonction 
réglementaire qui rattache les modèles de comportement réels et normaux à cette 
fonction, selon l'accord formel du conseil de production; b) une proposition structu-
relle différente qui énonce que, même si les modèles réels diffèrent des modèles nor-
maux, le conseil de production s'explique encore par sa fonction authentique; c) la 
proposition de fonction latente qui énonce que le conseil fournit aux parties dans 
l'entreprise une fonction différente de celle qui est manifestée dans les statuts. 
Les trois propositions ont été examinées une à une. La proposition de fonction 
réglementaire est à rejeter comme explication valable du conseil de production. La 
deuxième proposition n'apparaît pas être une explication alternative et elle est aussi à 
rejeter. Les deux propositions ont été analysées à partir de données recueillies auprès 
d'un échantillon représentatif de 201 membres de conseils de production dans l'in-
dustrie en Israël. 
La fonction latente semble fournir une explication valable du conseil de produc-
tion dans l'entreprise. Touchant les limites imposées aux parties dans l'entreprise par 
la convention collective nationale dans l'industrie en Israël, le conseil répond aux be-
soins des parties dans l'entreprise d'être impliquées dans le processus de négociation. 
Le conseil de production est un mécanisme de négociations pour ces parties. Aussi 
longtemps que le conseil de production conserve cette fonction et continue à contri-
buer à de telles réalisations, les parties continueront à soutenir le conseil de produc-
tion, quelle que soit sa fonction réglementaire. 
